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Abstract
With the unprecedented growth in the diversity of digital distribution platforms, there has been an increasing concern
about privacy of the content being produced by the different types of applications users are installing across a variety
of mobile platforms. The mobile devices average users own generally have inbuilt hardware interfaces capable of
gathering different types of rich information including temperature, accelerometer, as well as personal identifiable
information such as phone numbers, personal communication messages, and location information. Some digital dis-
tribution platforms, like Google’s Play Store (GPStore), created a permission-based security model in which users
are prompted with a list of permissions they must accept in order to download and install an application. In recent
years many researchers have presented attacks compromising the previous security model using different types of
techniques including malicious applications such as malware and trojans.
To better understand mobile malware, we introduce the concept of the User-App Agreement (UAA) — a concep-
tual framework for a user consenting to and trusting specific actions an app may perform. Using UAA we examine
the Android Permission system with Android Census — a comprehensive app metadata database. We conclude the
main shortcoming lies in the Permission system’s lack of addressing context and use, presenting an opportunity for
Info Theft Malware — malicious software that profits off of users’ personal information. Finally, we present Android
Malware Evaluation Detection and Analysis (AndroMEDA), an Android Security Extension which forms a novel
feedback loop, providing users with a method for understanding the context and use of actions an app performs, thus
allowing them to identify suspicious behavior that violates users’ trust.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Thesis Statement: Using a novel feedback loop, we provide users with a method for understanding the context and
use of actions that a mobile app performs, thus allowing users to identify suspicious behavior that violates their trust.
The rise of smartphones in the last decade has been unprecedented. Since the launch of the Apple iPhone in 2007,
there are now almost 1 billion smartphone users in the world[39]. These new devices mark an unprecedented shift
in our relationship with computers, becoming the center point for many personal endeavors, and superseding almost
all previous computing devices including cell phones, cameras, GPS devices, and to most uses of a desktop PC[31].
Smartphones continue to become the focal point of almost all personal computing — and consequently the operating
systems they run become more important and powerful.
1.1 Contributions
In this thesis, we highlight four key areas:
• User-App Agreement: First, we discuss the challenges of addressing modern mobile malware and the shortcom-
ings of the Android security model. We introduce the User-App Agreement (UAA) — a way of conceptualizing
the trust a user has in actions an application may perform — as a key component in identifying malicious
behavior.
• Android Census: Second, we use a novel dataset, Android Census, to examine the state of Android permissions.
We find Android permissions correlate with expected use, but key examples are shown of less than legitimate
use. Using a comprehensive set of malware, we cross-examine how the permissions of malware compares with
the Android Census. We conclude that malware that targets the user’s personal information is the most difficult
to detect using this static analysis.
• IncognitoWare: Third, we address the shortcomings of the current malware datasets available to academia and
introduce a new dataset of IncognitoWare. This dataset is more representative of current trends in malware and
proves to be a great challenge to detect.
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• AndroMEDA: Finally, we introduce Android Malware Evaluation Detection and Analysis (AndroMEDA), a set
of Android extensions and a companion app built off of the premise of the User-App Agreement. By giving the
user more information on the context and use of sensitive system actions, they can evaluate whether they trust
those actions and, ultimately, whether the app is acting maliciously or not.
2
Chapter 2
Background & Motivation
Figure 2.1: Worldwide Market Share of various mobile OSs - from [61] and [25]
Mobile OSs, like the PC operating systems of the 1990s, have a few major players that wield the most influence,
as seen in Figure 2.1. The two largest operating systems in the mobile area are Android and iOS. Apple’s iOS, made
exclusively for the Apple iPhone and iPad, runs on over 20%[25] of all smartphones globally, as of the end of 2012.
Google’s Android, released as an open source OS, has many different hardware manufacturers: Samsung, LG, HTC,
Motorola, and many more. It currently runs the majority of smartphones globally, with 70%[25] marketshare. Some
of the less popular though still significant mobile operating systems are Windows Phone, with 3%, and Blackberry,
with 3.5%[25] .
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2.1 iOS
Apple released the iPhone in 2007. “Entry into mobile phones might have been a risky move for Apple. The industry
was dominated by Nokia, Motorola, and Samsung, with roughly 60% market share”[66]. However, “the Apple iPhone
was a huge success. Considered by Time magazine the invention of the year 2007 ... it completely changed the mobile
phones industry dynamics”[48]. Apple’s iPhone and iOS were novel due to their touch friendly and intuitive OS, as
well as their digital distribution platform, the App Store[66]. In 2012, Apple sold over 130 million iOS devices[25].
Figure 2.2: Worldwide Sales of various mobile OSs - from [62] and [25]
2.2 Android
Started in 2003 by Andy Rubin and Android Inc (previously the makers of the T-Mobile Sidekick), Android was
acquired by Google Inc. in 2005[20]. “Android was built from the ground-up to enable developers to create compelling
mobile applications that take full advantage of all a handset has to offer. It was built to be truly open. For example, an
application can call upon any of the phone’s core functionality such as making calls, sending text messages, or using
the camera, allowing developers to create richer and more cohesive experiences for users”[45]. Since its initial release
in 2007[44], Android has sky-rocketed to the most used mobile OS in the world, with over 70% marketshare, and 144
million Android devices being sold in Q4 of 2012 alone[25] — more than Apple had the entire year, as seen in Figure
2.2.
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2.3 Goals of Mobile OSs
All these mobile OSs share many common goals and challenges. The diversity of hardware that smartphones were
designed to replace, along with other constraints and features, requires a mobile OS that’s designed from the ground-
up to deal with many different challenges than the typical PC OS. Some of the main design challenges for a mobile
OS include:
• Small memory footprint, battery-conscious, and other resource restrictions
• Access to a wide variety of personally identifiable information (PII)
• Access to a wide array of hardware
In order to effectively enforce rules on battery consumption, low-latency UI, and personally identifiable information,
a new security model was created, centered around the concept of the App.
2.4 The App and Sandboxing
In the mobile world, Apps are isolated and sandboxed programs, generally designed with a singular purpose. They
lack dependencies and generally less privileged than system software for performing many tasks. The mechanisms
for accessing functionality outside of their sandbox is enforced by a set of policies the system holds, specific to that
app. On some platforms, like iOS, only one app may run at any given time, and background computation is virtually
non-existent (with some exceptions1), along with many other restrictions. On Android and other mobile platforms,
many more features are available to apps, but in all cases, the app lifecycle is well-defined and controlled by the system
much more than on a PC OS.
Various reasons exist for the tight sandboxing of mobile apps. Power and resource consumption are certainly
a factor — mobile OSs generally reserve the right to terminate apps if they attempt to allocate too much memory.
Controlling access to hardware also helps with this — allowing apps to keep the phone awake could easily drain
battery. However, another reason for sandboxing, and arguably more important, is protecting Personally Identifiable
Information.
2.4.1 Personally Identifiable Information
Personally Identifiable Information (PII), as defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, is “any
information about an individual maintained by an agency, including (1) any information that can be used to distinguish
or trace an individuals identity... and (2) any other information that is linked or linkable to an individual” [38]. Mobile
devices — having blended cameras, cell phones, GPS devices, and PCs into one device — have an extremely diverse
1Minor amounts of computation can be done to compute background audio, and other isolated background tasks.
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amount of PII, including phone numbers, contacts, location history, bank account numbers and pictures. For many of
these datasets, mobile OSs actually organize them into databases with the intention of allowing third parties access to
them. Contact lists, SMS, photographs and location history are available to apps on virtually every mobile platform
in some official way. This is a driving motivation for a greatly improved security model for mobile OSs: controlling
third party software’s access to PII.
2.4.2 Digital Distribution Platform
The final major difference between mobile OSs and PC OSs is the distribution of code. No mobile OS allows third
party code to be run outside of the sandbox, and all of them require the user’s consent before installing an app. All apps
must be signed. In general, there is one main distribution channel for all apps on a mobile OS. This tightly-controlled
distribution both aids in security, and controls the ecosystem around that mobile OS.
2.4.3 Apple’s App Store
The first major digital distribution platform for mobile apps was Apple’s App Store[11]. Its model has been repeated
by almost all major mobile app distribution platforms. The basic premise is simple: developers sign up to the app
store, pay a fee (usually yearly), and submit fully-finished apps. A reviewer runs the app in a monitored sandbox,
watches for unusual behavior, checks for stability and usability, and approves it. Once the app has been approved, it is
released onto the app store, at which point anyone can download it. The approval process, as well as the high monetary
fee, act as a way to ensure only safe and high-quality apps are available for that platform. In this type of platform,
typically no apps may be installed from other sources. On iOS, initially this was the main method of security: if the
app passed the inspection, it was acknowledged as safe and virtually unmonitored unless someone noticed something
unusual and reported it. However, in recent years, after certain incidents (see section 4.6.1), apps must still request
permission from the user to perform certain tasks.
2.4.4 Android Permissions
Android’s distribution platform takes a different approach. At its core is Android’s security model: The Permission
System (see section 3). When Android Apps are packaged, they declare what capabilities they will use and the user
reviews them before installation. If the user approves the app, it may use the requested capabilities at any time: little
restrictions are placed otherwise. With this barrier in mind, the Google Play Store (formerly known as the Android
Market), or GPStore, opts for an alternate model to iOS, in which the developer pays a smaller fee and apps do not
go through a formal approval process. After an app’s submission, it is immediately released to the public for users
to download and run. Android assumes that the metadata the GPStore provides — App Name, Developer Name,
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Description, Reviews, and Ratings — are enough for the user to determine if the app should be trusted with the
permission set it is given (see Figure 2.3). In fact, Android even allows the device to accept apps from third party
sources — a practice known as sideloading — although it is disabled by default. This has spawned a large number of
third party app sources, all of which rely on the Permission system for user protection.
Figure 2.3: A sample page on the Google Play Store, see 2.1
A App name
B Developer Name
C App Rating
D Number of ratings
E Date the app was last updated
F Category in the Google Play Store it falls under
G Number of installs (range, not exact number)
H Description of the app
I Reviews of the app
J Permissions the app requests
Table 2.1: Various properties of a Google Play Store app page
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2.5 Mobile Malware
Malware, as defined by the US Department of Homeland Security, is “short for malicious software. Programming
(code, scripts, active content, and other software) designed to disrupt or deny operation, gather information that leads
to loss of privacy or exploitation, gain unauthorized access to system resources, and other abusive behavior” [40]. Like
PC OSs, malware is present on mobile OSs, although there are differences.
The tighter security model of mobile OSs has a notable effect on mobile malware. With tight control in sandboxing
and app distribution, the usual viruses, trojans, and other exploits are more difficult to employ. The main vectors are
either OS-level exploits — sneaking past the app review process — or through sideloading of apps. When looking
at the two main mobile OSs, a stark contrast is shown. iOS has had jailbreaking — privilege escalation exploits
— dating back from its first release [18]. Alternately, the first Android exploit was not discussed until 2010 by
security researchers Papathanasiou and Percoco [46], and was not seen in use until early 2011[15]. On the contrary,
no sideloading is possible for iOS, and there have been very few instances of malware sneaking past Apple’s App
Store review process (although it has happened2). With 95% of all mobile malware[42], Android’s malware situation
is a product of the sideloading and lack of review process found in GPStore[42].
On mobile devices, one of the dominant goals of malware is to gather information that leads to loss of privacy,
found in over 28% of mobile malware in 2012 alone[42]. The trend of malware possessing no system exploits, but
gathering information that leads to loss of privacy — Info Theft Malware — is one that Android’s Permission-based
security model is ill-equipped to handle. Android’s permission system relies on the user to determine upon installation
if a list of capabilities should be entrusted with the given app. The user is not given a say in how or when the capabilities
may be used, nor the ability to reject specific capabilities. At the same time, the mechanisms that keep mobile OSs
safe are forcing malware writers to use more subtle techniques, often without exploits. This all works against the user.
This paper attempts to address this key issue through various means. We first introduce several novel concepts for
analyzing apps and malware on Android. We then analyze the state of Android apps and Permissions with the most
comprehensive Android app database available, Android Census. Finally, we propose several novel improvements to
the Android security architecture, called AndroMEDA, aimed at expanding on of our conceptual work.
2In July 2012, SecureList noticed an iOS app that uploaded all of the user’s contacts to a remote location without their consent[37], but others
argued this was not as devious as made out to be[57]
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Chapter 3
Permissions & Security on Android
3.1 Android Architecture Overview
Android is an open source project, built on Linux. Designed to be a lightweight, modular, extendable, and versatile
operating system, Android removed almost all of the typical GNU/Linux stack, and wrote an entire framework from
scratch. Built in Java, Android runs the Dalivk VM, a lightweight Java-compatible VM (see Figure 3.1).
The three major application components of Android are Activities, Services, and Content Providers. They are
joined together through the Intent system. Activities are user-facing tasks, and follow the iOS definition of an app.
Only one may run at a time, and they have strict lifecycles. Services run in the background and follow a less strict
lifecycle. Their main purpose is to perform long-running tasks that do not require user input. Lastly, Content Providers
“manage access to a structured set of data. They encapsulate the data, and provide mechanisms for defining data
security. Content providers are the standard interface that connects data in one process with code running in another
process”[5].
Android was built from the ground-up to be composed of strongly isolated modules with little dependencies. No
traditional SysV IPC is allowed; instead Android provides its own inter-app communication built off of its Intent
system. Intents on Android, as described in the documentation, are “an abstract description of an operation to be per-
formed... An Intent provides a facility for performing late runtime binding between the code in different applications.
Its most significant use is in the launching of activities, where it can be thought of as the glue between activities. It is
basically a passive data structure holding an abstract description of an action to be performed”[6]. Intents allow apps
to describe the operation they would like to perform, without explicitly identifying a recipient. For example, when the
intent ACTION VIEW is sent with data “http://google.com”, Android searches through all installed apps that designate
that they respond to that intent and will pick one to deliver it to; in this case, the Browser would respond.
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Figure 3.1: An overview of the Android system architecture, from [2]
3.2 Android Permissions
The highly modular and decentralized aspect of Android makes it extremely easy to tap into virtually all Personally
Identifiable Information on the device. To protect this, and many other aspects of the system, Android utilizes the
Permission security model. The permission security model is a static list of capabilities an app possesses: when
presented with this list before installation (see Figure 3.2), a user will either grant the app access to the features or
simply not install the app. When an app requests a permission, the Android system treats it as if the user granted the
app that capability. After installation, this list will never change unless the app package itself changes and the user
reviews the new permissions.
Android permissions themselves are much more granular than a typical UNIX permission system. They cover a
wide variety of operations, including controlling the sleep state, accessing hardware, accessing PII, and many system
operations. Some of the most requested permissions can be seen in Table 3.1; the rest can be seen in Appendix Table
A.1.
In cases like WAKE LOCK and CAMERA, the permission seems fairly singular: access to exactly one fea-
ture. However, for other permissions, such as INTERNET and READ PHONE STATE, many more granularities
could be established. For example, INTERNET gives unconditional access to all domains, unlike web pages in
modern web browsers. In addition, while permissions are intended to be non-overlapping, there still are ways —
varying from minor to major — to acquire information guarded by one permission from another. For example,
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Figure 3.2: A sample Google Play Store install screen showing the permissions. The user must scroll to see all of
them, and click “Show All” to see the hidden ones.
READ PHONE STATE can access to the current phone call, and is able to establish call logs, an operation nor-
mally protected by READ CONTACTS. There are some permissions, however, that are explicitly supersets of an-
other other, such as ACCESS COURSE LOCATION — providing network-tower location — and its superset, AC-
CESS FINE LOCATION — providing GPS location.
Permissions do not tend to change through Android’s release history. As new hardware is made accessible through
Android’s SDK, new permissions are added for them, but there are very few times when permissions drastically change
meaning or scope. Through Android’s 6 year history, only 3 new permissions has been added to restrict previously
unrestricted operations1.
3.3 Permission Enforcement
Permission enforcement on Android is generally performed in two main ways: UNIX permissions and explicit runtime
checking. Most hardware is accessible using C or other low-level calls, so permissions are more effectively enforced
via UNIX Group Permissions. Upon app installation, Android assigns each app a unique UID and assigns different
group permissions to that user. For example, socket access is granted to a UNIX group, and all apps that request
1In Android 4.1, the storage device requires a permission to read, and the call logs require a separate permission to read and write — previously
they shared a permission with contacts[41].
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Permission Description
INTERNET Network communication. full Internet access. Allows the app to create network sockets.
WRITE EXTERNAL -
STORAGE
Storage. modify/delete USB storage contents modify/delete SD card contents. Allows the app to
write to the USB storage. Allows the app to write to the SD card.
READ PHONE STATE Phone calls. read phone state and identity. Allows the app to access the phone features of the
device. An app with this permission can determine the phone number and serial number of this
phone, whether a call is active, the number that call is connected to and the like.
ACCESS FINE -
LOCATION
Your location. fine (GPS) location. Access fine location sources such as the Global Positioning
System on the tablet, where available. Malicious apps may use this to determine where you are, and
may consume additional battery power.
ACCESS COARSE -
LOCATION
Your location. coarse (network-based) location. Access coarse location sources such as the cellular
network database to determine an approximate tablet location, where available. Malicious apps may
use this to determine approximately where you are.
WAKE LOCK System tools. prevent tablet from sleeping prevent phone from sleeping.
READ CONTACTS Your personal information. read contact data. Allows the app to read all of the contact (address)
data stored on your tablet. Malicious apps may use this to send your data to other people.
CALL PHONE Services that cost you money. directly call phone numbers. Allows the app to call phone numbers
without your intervention. Malicious apps may cause unexpected calls on your phone bill. Note
that this doesn’t allow the app to call emergency numbers.
CAMERA Hardware controls. take pictures and videos. Allows the app to take pictures and videos with the
camera. This allows the app at any time to collect images the camera is seeing.
WRITE CONTACTS Your personal information. write contact data. Allows the app to modify the contact (address) data
stored on your tablet. Malicious apps may use this to erase or modify your contact data.
GET TASKS System tools. retrieve running apps. Allows the app to retrieve information about currently and
recently running tasks. Malicious apps may discover private information about other apps.
RECORD AUDIO Hardware controls. record audio. Allows the app to access the audio record path.
SEND SMS Services that cost you money. send SMS messages. Allows the app to send SMS messages. Mali-
cious apps may cost you money by sending messages without your confirmation.
READ HISTORY -
BOOKMARKS
Your personal information. read Browser’s history and bookmarks. Allows the app to read all the
URLs that the Browser has visited, and all of the Browser’s bookmarks.
READ CALENDAR Your personal information. read calendar events plus confidential information. Allows the app to
read all calendar events stored on your tablet, including those of friends or coworkers. Malicious
apps may extract personal information from these calendars without the owners’ knowledge.
WRITE HISTORY -
BOOKMARKS
Your personal information. write Browser’s history and bookmarks. Allows the app to modify the
Browser’s history or bookmarks stored on your tablet. Malicious apps may use this to erase or
modify your Browser’s data
RECEIVE SMS Your messages. receive SMS. Allows the app to receive and process SMS messages. Malicious
apps may monitor your messages or delete them without showing them to you.
WRITE CALENDAR Your personal information. add or modify calendar events and send email to guests without owners’
knowledge. Allows the app to send event invitations as the calendar owner and add, remove, change
events that you can modify on your device, including those of friends or co-workers. Malicious
apps may send spam emails that appear to come from calendar owners, modify events without the
owners’ knowledge, or add fake events.
MOUNT UNMOUNT -
FILESYSTEMS
System tools. mount and unmount filesystems. Allows the app to mount and unmount filesystems
for removable storage.
READ SMS Your messages. read SMS or MMS. Allows the app to read SMS messages stored on your tablet or
SIM card. Malicious apps may read your confidential messages.
READ LOGS Your personal information. read sensitive log data. Allows the app to read from the system’s various
log files. This allows it to discover general information about what you are doing with the tablet,
potentially including personal or private information.
DISABLE KEYGUARD System tools. disable keylock. Allows the app to disable the keylock and any associated pass-
word security. A legitimate example of this is the phone disabling the keylock when receiving an
incoming phone call, then re-enabling the keylock when the call is finished.
Table 3.1: Frequently Requested Android permissions, and the GPStore’s description of them
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INTERNET are added to that group. This is simple, effective, and has very little performance overhead. Unfortunately,
it makes it difficult to enforce when and how these resources are accessed.
System operations — like wake locks, changing system settings, turning on and off components, etc. — are
checked on every API call, through a centralized PackageManager class. The PackageManager first checks if the app
has requested that permission. If it has, it then proceeds to check if the permission is protected by the system. Some
permissions are only available to trusted code via either a shared key or being located in a system folder. Many system
operations fall into this category, including WIPE DEVICE and BRICK. Typically, these operations are extremely
dangerous and have the potential to destroy a device or perform elaborate phishing operations. Even if an app requests
the permission, the PackageManager still has the right to reject the operation. This allows trusted developers access to
system-level operations post-deployment on a device, while still protecting the operations from untrusted developers.
The final aspect of permissions deals with protecting PII. Android implements the bulk of PII sources through
Content Providers, which manage a dataset and provide access to remote services. It is therefore imperative for
each individual data source to check the permissions of the incoming app, every time it is requested. This, however,
provides opportunities to extend its behavior.
3.3.1 Permission Rejection
When a permission is checked in Android, one of two outcomes is possible: (1) The check passes, and the operation
continues as intended, or (2) the check fails and an exception is thrown. By design, the code path instantly jumps to
an error state, halting the action. No logging of this action takes place, nor are partial passes allowed.
3.4 Third Party Permissions
Android was built to distribute PII in a modular fashion, and it extended these features to other third party apps.
Any developer may write Content Providers and, likewise, may create Permissions to protect them. Other apps
must request that permission before accessing the data. For example: Alice writes a messaging app, MyMes-
senger. She wants to expose the PII to other apps; so she makes a Content Provider around it. To protect the
user’s information, she defines her own permissions: mypackage.MyMessenger.READ MESSAGES and mypack-
age.MyMessenger.WRITE MESSAGES. Bob writes an app that uses MyMessenger’s data to build a picture. His
app requests the permission mypackage.MyMessenger.READ MESSAGES. When his app contacts Alice’s Content
Provider, her app checks this custom permission before proceeding with the query. However, if Bob does not request
mypackage.MyMessenger.WRITE MESSAGES and attempts to perform a write action, Alice’s Content Provider will
reject the operation.
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If two apps request the same permissions, as long as neither have access to system permissions, it can be assumed
that they have the same capabilities. Additionally, these capabilities are permanent, as permissions for a given package
can not be added nor removed. This Permission Fingerprint, or set of capabilities, uniquely defines what an app
has access to. All apps that request the same set of permissions have access to the exact same set of actions, and
only through those permissions do they have those actions (with a few exceptions). Android permissions are static,
however, and therefore a Permission Fingerprint doesn’t guarantee a specific pattern of behavior. In fact, since not
all permissions are guaranteed to be granted, a Permission Fingerprint simply establishes the absolute maximum
capabilities of an app — even if the system rejects some of them.
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Chapter 4
Malware on Android
Malware on mobile devices has seen a departure from past exploits. The wealth of Personally Identifiable Information
easily available on mobile OSs increasingly makes them the focus of malicious software. In addition, the tight sand-
boxing constraints often forces malware writers to either find exploits to break out of the sandbox or to write malware
that cloaks itself as benign. Without finding exploits, code can not be run by the user unless it is in it is form and comes
through a trusted channel (unless of course that security feature has been disabled). Once on the device, malware has
several main methods of attack.
4.1 Installation
The three primary ways in which malware can be installed on an Android device are Repackaging, Update Attack, and
Drive-by Download[67]. The first two are designed to sneak malware into the Google Play Store or other third party
stores; and the third is designed to trick the user into installing it by mistake. Repackaging deals with the technique of
taking an existing app, adding malicious code to it, and repackaging it again (discussed further in Chapter 8.2). Update
Attacks typically build off of Repackaging, but do not acquire malicious code until later, making static detection
difficult[67]. The last, Drive-By Downloads, is often tied with Repackaging, but is not presented in an official app
channel. Instead, it is downloaded when the user visits a webpage or clicks a link[67] and Android prompts the user as
to whether or not they would like to install the app. All three methods involve concealing the intent of the malware and
passing as a legitimate app; they do not use browser exploits or system exploits to install the initial malware without
the user’s consent.
4.2 Malicious Actions
Once installed on the device, Android malware has several main methods of attack. Xuxian Jiang and Yajin Zhou[67],
along with Spreitzenbarth[54], and Hackmageddon[28] define four major categories: Privilege Escalation Attack,
Remote Control Attack, Monetary Service Attacks, and Privacy Info Theft.
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4.3 Privilege Escalation Attack
Privilege escalation attacks take several forms on Android. The basic premise is simple: acquire access to operations
beyond what the sandbox and granted capabilities provide. The main way to accomplish this is via rooting.
4.3.1 Rooting
Rooting is the act of acquiring root — or administrative privileges — on an OS. Typically mobile OSs do not provide
the user or apps with root capabilities and instead reserve that for a set of trusted system processes. However, by
finding vulnerabilities in these services or exploiting the OS itself, apps can escape the sandbox. After an app has
been granted root capabilities, the permission system no longer applies to it: it can simply access whatever it wants.
These attacks are difficult for the system to detect as all monitoring of apps relies on monitoring the sandbox — there
is no way to track an app that escapes the sandbox. This technique is commonly employed by botnets, giving remote
access to the core system.
Many examples of root exploits exist, dating back to 2011 with RageAgainstTheCage[35]. These root exploits
were very popular for non-malicious purposes, circumventing the device’s sandbox to install a permanent root binary,
creating a similar setup to a typical UNIX computer, where root may be acquired after a password and/or permission.
In March 2011, however, DroidDream was discovered. DroidDream used RageAgainstTheCage to silently install
additional applications in the background, stealing PII and forming a botnet. By the time Google remotely removed
it from the market, it had been downloaded an estimated 50,000 to 200,000 times[15], which was the largest bulk-
remote-removal of apps seen from the GPStore. From then on, a stream of root exploit malware was found based off
of exploits such as RageAgainstTheCage, udev, and another called GingerMaster[26].
Recent Android Rootkits
GingerMaster[52] is significant because it is the last known root exploit malware seen in use. Designed for Android
2.3.3, it can currently run on 45% of all Android devices in use, according to the official Android Dashboard[4]. In
reality, however, of that 45%, almost all have been patched to fix the exploit[52]. All previous exploits were patched
in Android 2.3[52], meaning less than 6% of all active Android devices are vulnerable to them. Since Android 4.0,
Google has focused greatly on security, improving ASLR[24] and hardening system services[7]. No known rootkits
exist — malicious or not — for Android 4.0 and up comprising 54% of active Android devices.
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4.3.2 Confused Deputy Attack
The second main vector for privilege escalation attacks is the confused deputy attack[29]. In this scenario, services that
guard sensitive operations are “tricked” into performing them. For example, if a Content Provider forgets to check
a permission, or if a developer finds APIs that do not correctly perform a permission check. Perhaps the simplest
example of this is the ability for any Android app to contact remote servers by asking the web browser to open a
URL. By including sensitive data in the URL, an app may still transmit sensitive data to a remote server without ever
requesting the INTERNET permission. Projects like XManDroid[13] and Quire[19] address this by extending Android
to analyze inter-app communication and detect this kind of attack.
4.4 Remote Control Attack
Remote Control Attacks, frequently called botnets, are the ability for malware to accept commands from a remote
server, controlling the device. This technique is common — Xuxian Jiang and Yajin Zhou[67] found in 93% of
Android malware — and is often used in conjunction with other attacks[54].
4.5 Monetary Service Attack
The second malware technique is possibly the simplest: perform services on behalf of the user that cost money.
Examples of this include calling costly phone numbers and sending premium SMS messages. Typically these actions
are performed without notifying the user, and are only visible after the user checks their bill. These attacks have been
prevalent in the Android market for quite a while, with NQ Mobile[42] listing it as one of the top three threats of 2012,
and being found in 39 of 119 of the malware documented by Spreitzenbarth[54]. However, recent versions of Android
(after 4.2 Jelly Bean[7]) have taken the step of warning the user before premium SMSs are sent.
A prime example of this is FakeInst[60], a repackaged version of Instagram[32] that sent premium SMS messages
on start. “In the background, the fake downloader sends a premium rate SMS to the number based on the country of
origin for the user”[60]. In many cases, the premium SMS messages would end up being billed to the user for over $4
each[60], without ever alerting the user. Messages are often deleted by the app, removing the trace until the user gets
their bill.
4.6 Private Info Theft
The last malware technique is the most significant, and represents the largest departure from typical malware: apps
that steal PII, or Info Theft Malware. The theme is fairly straightforward: provide the user with a seemingly legitimate
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app, but in the background acquire large amounts of valuable data — including call logs, contacts, and photos — and
send them to a remote server. This fits with the main themes of mobile computing: the consolidation of many sources
of PII all in one device. To the system no unusual operations are performed and no exploits are ran. The qualification
for Info Theft Malware lies in the “use” versus “misuse” of PII; often times, this line is blurred.
4.6.1 Path on iOS
A large distinction of what constitutes as privacy malware to an individual stems from the user’s expectations of
how the app will use their PII. Consider the case of the Path iPhone app, which in February 2012 was discovered
to be uploading the user’s entire contact list to Path’s servers, without any consent from the user[55]. It is fairly
uncontroversial for a social network to read your contact data, and the act of scanning contacts to help “find your
friends” on Path wasn’t out of the ordinary. As VentureBeat discovered: “Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Foursquare,
Foodspotting, Yelp, and Gowalla are among a smattering of iOS applications that have been sending the actual names,
email addresses and/or phone numbers from your device’s internal address book to their servers”[58]. Ultimately,
however, the outrage was sparked because of how unexpected the behavior was.
The Path incident sparked several key changes in iOS’s security model: having a popup occur when an app requests
access to the contacts database and allowing the user to reject the request. This, in general, is a one-time request, after
which the app is granted unrestricted access to the content[1]. This change, however, did not fully address situations
like Path, in which is was less about the app simply having access to the data, and more about what the app actually
did with the data behind the scenes. When these actions did not match up with user expectations, the app was treated
as malware until the situation was cleared up by Path. The next day, Path issued an update that immediately explained
to the user what they were going to do with the data and why.
It is worth noting that the only reason Path’s contacts upload mechanism was discovered was by accident: Arun
Thampi discovered it as part of a company hackathon, and only via sniffing the HTTP requests coming from the phone.
An ordinary smartphone user would not have access to these tools, nor have the time and patience to sift through the
data to spot unusual behavior. These actions are unchecked and hidden from the user, denying them the ability to
decide for themselves if they are comfortable with them — supporting our motivation for AndroMEDA.
4.7 User-App Agreement
The Path incident, however, lies at the heart of mobile malware: misuse of PII lies in the abstract definition of how the
app is expected to behave. Apps that violate this expectation of behavior are classified as malware, while apps that do
follow this expectation are not. This agreement between the user and the app — the User-App Agreement (or UAA)
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— is an informal understanding the user has as to what actions an app will take. This differs from the Permission
Fingerprint, which is a measure of what actions the app is capable of performing, dealing instead with exactly when
and how those actions are taken. Since this agreement is not formally defined, it is acquired through external trust in
an app. This happens in various ways, through the description the app provides, the knowledge and referral of the app
from other trusted sources, or the trust in the developer. The UAA is not a measure of how trustworthy an app is, but
rather a framework for the user consenting and trusting specific actions an app may take.
4.7.1 UAA Example - Social Networking App
An example of UAA can be seen in the expected behavior of a hypothetical app and user. The first is a large Social
Networking app, which requests permission to access internet, send SMS messages, and read the contacts database.
If the Social Networking app accesses contacts when the user requests “find my friends”, and it sends SMS messages
after the user messages another user who is not “online”, these actions fall within the UAA of the Social Networking
app and the user. However, if the contacts database is read and uploaded to a remote server without the consent of the
user, this may violate the UAA and break the trust of the user (expanding on the example of Path).
4.7.2 UAA Example - Social Game
The other example is a little known developer’s game, which, like the social networking app, also requests permission
to access internet, send SMS messages, and read contacts. These documented capabilities in the Permission Finger-
print may be enough to violate the UAA: the user may not trust an app with the capability of these actions. However,
in the case that the user does, or simply doesn’t pay attention, the app still may not violate the UAA. If the app is an
online game and asks you to find other people you know who are playing it, this would more likely than not violate the
UAA. Furthermore, if it sends SMS messages to your friends telling them to download the game, this would breech
the UAA and break the trust of the user.
In both examples, the apps have the exact same Permission Fingerprint, but vary widely in their expected behavior,
and which actions are trusted and untrusted. This misuse of PII and other device capabilities fits with our definition of
malware, and highlights the shortcomings of the Permissions framework: being unable to deal with the subtle differ-
ences between trusted behavior and untrusted behavior. Indeed, every user may have a very different understanding of
what acceptable behavior is. Therefore, UAA plays a crucial role in classifying apps in relation to Info Theft Malware.
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4.8 Proof of Concept Malware in Academia
In the realm of malware research in academia, several prominent proof-of-concept examples further demonstrate
the vague line between use and misuse of PII and our concept, the User-App Agreement. The most notable one is
SoundComber[50]. It passes off as a benign app, but, in the background records audio and does on-phone processing
to find sensitive PII, after which it uploads the information to a remote server. This app is unique because of its simple
Permission Fingerprint, as well as its ability to gather sensitive PII from a channel not suspected to be very rich in PII.
The second prominent example of academic malware on Android is TapLogger[64]. TapLogger imitates a simple
touch-based game, learning the vibration patterns of the device for each tap. By recording the vibration patterns in
the background, it attempts to discover passwords and other sensitive keyboard events, all through a seemingly trusted
sensor. TapLogger requests no Permissions; therefore its behavior is possible for any app.
In Chapter 8.2, we expand upon these examples to present an additional dataset of IncognitoWare – repackaged
apps with malicious software added — designed for research purposes. We keep the Permission Fingerprints identical
to the cloned app, making detection exceptionally difficult.
4.9 Conclusion
The landscape of malware on Android follows many clear patterns. The first is the use of masquerading as benign apps,
and passing through trusted or semi-trusted channels to enter the device. Once on the device, the malware manifests
itself as one of four main categories of attacks — privilege escalation attacks, remote-control attacks, monetary service
attacks, and personal info theft. Of these categories, privilege escalation attacks and monetary service attacks are the
easiest to protect against — and indeed Android has taken serious steps to mitigate these. The third time of attack,
however, personal info theft is the most difficult to mitigate on Android due to the shortcomings of the Permissions
framework, and the wide spectrum of severity these attacks can take. Since these attacks may vary in interpretation
per user and lay in the subtle communication between the user and the app, we highlight the need for a concise
representation UAA, where the user can evaluate the actions themselves.
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Chapter 5
Related Works
5.1 Android Extensions
AndroMEDA is far from the first to attempt to address the issue of malware on Android. As early as 2009, frameworks
such as SAINT[43] built off of the Android Permission Framework by implementing runtime policies the user could
define per app. Later on, projects like TISSA[68] built off of SAINT by implementing varying levels of obfuscated
data. When an app running on TISSA requests access to the contacts database, TISSA can either provide the app
with the full database, a limited portion, an anonymized portion, or no information. Not all PII was covered in their
framework, nor were any temporal rules established: the system behavior for a specific database of PII for an app was
consistent across requests. These events were not shown to the user either, unlike TaintDroid[21].
TaintDroid is a novel extension for Android, focused on flow detection of PII. By modifying the low-level VM of
Android — Dalvik — variables are tainted once they access PII. This taint flows throughout the system, and when
the variable reaches a designated exit location, the event is logged and alerted to the user. Finally, YAASE[49] is
a relatively new security extension, but combines many aspects of TaintDroid and TISSA to become an extremely
powerful way of detecting information flow and prevention.
There are several main shortcomings in all of these frameworks. First off, they all require significant modification
of the Android codebase, thus creating very difficult work for developers who seek to incorporate these extensions
into their Android OS. Performance impact, although by many accounts is somewhat negligible, certainly plays a role
in a decision to incorporate such security extensions.
Second, the complex rulesets required build off of the Permission Framework, adding additional rules the user
may configure. However, a study by Berkeley suggests only 17% of users paid attention to permissions at install time,
and only 3% correctly remembered them later[23]. Clearly, tasking the user with more work is the wrong approach.
Looking at malware through the context of the UAA, all but TaintDroid fall short in one key regard: alerting the user
of suspicious behavior.
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Several frameworks have touched upon the concept of the UAA. Andromaly[53] (developed in 2010), pBMDS[63],
and Crowdroid[14] all attempt to classify malware based upon its interaction with the user. However, none actually
ask immediate input from the user — a fundamental flaw that limits the ability to adapt to the user’s specific UAAs.
5.2 Android Sandboxes
On the other side of malware detection is automated malware detection. The major project in this regard is Google’s
Bouncer[34]. Introduced in 2011, Google Bouncer is a system that runs malware in a highly-observed sandbox, and
watches for suspicious behavior. Since its release, it has been highly criticized[36], with researchers finding over
twenty ways to circumvent it.
Similarly, TrendMicro provides its solution, App Reputation[56]. It runs apps in a “cloud” sandbox, watching for
connections to suspicious websites, as well as other monitoring. A research project, Paranoid Android[47], runs in
a similar vein, monitoring apps in a sandboxed Android OS. However, in order to get accurate information on app
behavior, actions must be recorded.
Most all of the frameworks listed above, however, especially the sandbox tools, assume a clear ruleset to be estab-
lished classifying malicious behavior versus benign behavior. They require a clear line to establish what constitutes
trusted behavior versus untrusted. Unfortunately, this counters the concept of the UAA, in which every individual
action has a complex set of rules that result in an acceptable behavior versus unacceptable. Users may also have vastly
different rules for what constitutes malicious behavior. Apps that send the Unique Device ID (UDID) and location
information to ad networks might seem malicious to some users, and perfectly normal to others.
5.3 Conclusion
The main counter argument to all of these frameworks is the example of SoundComber: it records audio in the
background, looking for PII. Some frameworks and policies may immediately flag this as malware; but one can
conceive of perfectly benign apps that follow this exact same formula: dictation apps that transcribe speech to text
over long portions of time, audio broadcasting utilities, etcetera. Apps that take all PII and upload it to a server may be
classic malware — or simply a backup utility. Context and use — and more generally the UAA — are an extremely
important part of malware detection that’s missing from modern Android security frameworks.
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Chapter 6
Android Malware Evaluation Detection and
Analysis
6.1 Goals
Android Malware Evaluation Detection and Analysis (AndroMEDA) is designed to complement existing Android
security extensions like TISSA[68], TaintDroid[21], YAASE[49], and XManDroid[13]. The goal in building An-
droMEDA was making the minimal amount of changes to the Android system in order to extract sufficient amounts
of information. Portability was important, as code that is easier to port can be more easily adopted. Along with being
lightweight and fast, portability further forced the extension to be as simple as possible. The framework aimed to be as
independent of hardware as possible, with the ability to work on any device: smartphone, tablet, TV, or future devices
like Google Glass. This portability meant as few changes to the low-level drivers and kernel as possible.
Functionally, the main goals of the framework are to better understand how apps behave, what PII and capabilities
they access, and to provide the user with the information necessary to quickly evaluate an app’s actions in relation to
its UAA. Logging sensitive events, finding strategic opportunities to expose these events to the user, giving the user
actions to perform in reaction, are key steps in mitigating malware — especially Info Theft Malware — on Android.
Unfortunately, as discussed in Chapter 3.3.1, Android does not log these sensitive events natively, thus motivating this
framework. Ultimately, it is expected that a framework such as this would not eliminate malware on Android, but
rather be part of a larger system.
As a base for our framework, we chose CyanogenMod[16], a third party open source Android distribution created
by volunteers. It provides firmware for a wide variety of Android devices, and its user-base is comprised of people
seeking to replace their stock OS. This makes it an ideal candidate to fork our framework from — our changes can
therefore be incorporated into the over 4.1m+ installs of CyanogenMod[17].
6.2 AndroMEDA Architecture
Android, as an open source project, is hosted at source.android.com[8], as a series of Git repositories managed
by a meta-script called repo. Its source tree is organized by project type; “frameworks”, “external” and “libcore” are
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Figure 6.1: AndroMEDA Architecture Overview
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Figure 6.2: Example code path of an app requesting data from the Contacts app
the top-level folders we focus on. “Frameworks” contains all of the Java, C++, C, assembly code, and other code that
compose the core framework that runs on top of the main libraries. “Libcore” and parts of “external” comprise the
main libraries. The bulk of the code lies in “frameworks/base”.
The architecture (seen in Figure 6.1), is organized into two main parts: (1) a collection of hooks in the API and
(2) a system service to collect this information. The collection of hooks in the API calls into a process-wide service
that translates them into events that get sent to the global system service. At the start of every new Dalvik process, the
process-wide collector installs hooks into the framework that notifies the collector when the APIs are called.
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The hooking mechanisms vary depending on the exact call being instrumented. Android has a standard mechanism
for checking permissions in many cases; and we placed a hook where this is enforced. Usually, this occurs during
a Remote Procedure Call (RPC) with the process that owns the data; as such, the remote UID is sent along (as seen
in Figure 6.2). Unfortunately, many permissions are not checked through this method, but Android Permissions
Demystified[22] has a comprehensive list of API calls and the permissions they require, making it easy to locate
essential APIs to instrument. For the more difficult APIs, a static global callback variable is placed in every class we
want to instrument. Upon launching the process, our local collector populates these global variables with callbacks
that marshal the data to the main collection service. Calls are then made to the callback at the appropriate times in the
API’s normal function (seen in Figure 6.3). Using this method, we are able to instrument any API call, getting more
data than when the permission is simply checked.
For C and C++ level code, we establish hooks in the Java Native Interface (JNI) — Java’s method of communicat-
ing with native code — to call back to the main object. Since using JNI to call back into Java from C is cumbersome
and error prone, the hooks call into a local callback, which then calls the process-wide callback accordingly. An
example can be seen in Figure 6.3.
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The ability to log virtually any API call is extremely valuable. Not only are permission events logged, but more
fine-grained events — like the starting and stopping of an audio recording — can be measured. Internet sockets are
logged, along with all POST data set out. Not only is this system light-weight and fast, but it does so with as little
modifications as possible. No kernel-level or Dalvik-vm-level changes are required.
The global service acts as the central point of collection of all events. It runs in its own process and uses Binders
(Android’s RPC) to communicate with other processes, which feed events into it. These calls are asynchronous, and
do not block the remote caller. The service is responsible for logging and processing the events, as well as taking
action on them.
Two way communication is also possible. An app’s local collector can query the global service and acquire a list of
events for a given package (among other things). This allows user-level apps to be written to leverage AndroMEDAs
findings.
6.3 Companion App
We wrote a companion app to allow the user to inspect the information being gathered by AndroMEDA. The com-
panion app responds to the Intents broadcast by the notifications that AndroMEDA displays to the user. This reports a
log of events by that app and allows the user to take action. The user may report an app or uninstall it. A simple web
service was set up to aggregate these reports.
The companion app is significant because it does not require the AndroMEDA framework to be present on the
phone to function. Despite the unavailability of local logs, the companion app can still query the web service, and
view event histories that other users have published.
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Chapter 7
Market Analysis
In order to evaluate AndroMEDA’s effectiveness in identifying malware, it is important to evaluate the ability to
identify malware without it. As previously discussed in Chapter 3, Permissions are the single security measure that
defends an Android user from malicious software. We show a fundamental disconnect between Permissions and UAA,
as conclusive evidence that Permissions should not be the sole security system on Android. In order to study this, we
must examine how the Permissions reflect app behavior, and if known malware can be identified with Permissions
alone.
7.1 Android Census
To do a broad scale study of Android permissions, we introduce a novel dataset: Android Census[3]. Android Census
contains a rich dataset of metadata of apps in the Google Play Store. We first obtain a list of all packages in the Google
Play Store from AndroidPit[9], a third party source that maintains an up-to-date index. We then crawl the GPStore
using this list and insert the data into a MySQL database. See Table 7.1 for statistics. The metadata described in 7.2
is rich in contextual information about an app. The GPStore was scanned twice per day, generating over 22 million
entries, for a period of one month — from May 2012 to June 2012 — after which it was stopped1. This dataset
provides detailed metadata for all apps included in our package list, including the most common apps, as well as also
a larger dataset of lesser known apps (see Figure 7.5). Despite the large amount of metadata available, we will focus
on the Permissions, installs, and category, leaving most other fields for Future Work (see Chapter 9.2).
7.2 Global Permission Analysis
We first look at the global trends of Permissions in the GPStore. Ideally, we are in search of a system where access
to sensitive PII and dangerous operations is only requested by a handful of apps that truly needs them. This would
increase the user’s ability to understand how an app behaves, increase the user’s trust in the Permission system, and
1We plan to continue scans in the future
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Scan Timestamp Number of Apps
2012-04-16 12:18:00 308975
2012-04-17 03:40:01 308821
2012-04-17 16:11:53 357439
2012-04-22 00:25:36 356944
2012-04-22 13:50:09 358346
2012-04-23 00:13:16 358297
2012-04-23 15:52:34 357689
2012-04-24 16:45:11 357310
2012-04-25 07:21:36 356431
2012-04-27 19:19:23 354778
2012-04-29 23:07:20 355955
2012-04-30 18:02:51 355345
2012-05-11 18:20:07 357087
2012-05-13 20:28:44 356490
2012-06-12 15:41:33 364555
2012-06-14 11:08:05 365762
2012-06-16 15:32:13 366231
2012-06-18 14:42:18 366551
2012-06-20 14:41:00 366929
2012-06-25 18:39:44 368534
2012-06-27 19:22:22 368839
2012-06-29 11:15:42 369686
2012-07-02 09:40:04 369590
2012-07-03 17:00:52 370472
Table 7.1: Statistics from Android Census
Metadata Description
App Name The name of the app, e.g. Google Maps
App Developer The name of the developer, e.g. Google
Android Version The lowest compatible Android version
Number of Installs The total number of installs. Given as a range.
Description A long (3000 word max) description of the app.
Reviews The user reviews of the app.
Overall Rating The overall rating of the app, from 1 to 5. A user does not need to write a review to leave a rating.
Requested Permissions The list of all the permissions the app requests.
Table 7.2: Metadata from Android Census
demonstrate a strong connection between the Permission Fingerprint and User-App Agreement. Ultimately, however,
we find a system that falls short of these goals.
Figure 7.1 shows all major permissions in the GPStore, sorted by frequency of use. This graph highlights several
things: first, INTERNET is a dominant permission, with well over half of the GPStore apps requesting it. The next 5
permissions — Write to Storage, Reading Phone Info, Location Info and Wake Lock — all are requested by over 50,000
apps. A steep drop is seen for Read Contacts, Call Phones, and Camera, with around 25,000 apps each. Of these top
nine, three provide access to semi-personal information: Reading Phone Info and the Location Info permissions. Only
the lower three grant access to personal information.
Figure 7.2 examines the tail permissions in the GPStore. This section contains the bulk of permissions related to
PII, with Record Audio, Read Calendar, Read SMS, etcetera. Additionally it contains many sensitive operations, like
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Figure 7.1: Permissions, sorted by how many apps request them in the entire GPStore dataset
Figure 7.2: Less commonly used permissions in the GPStore
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Send SMS and System Alert — which allows apps to draw windows over other apps. With every dangerous permission,
many legitimate use cases can be established that would not violate the UAA. See Figure 7.3 for examples.
Permission Use Case
Location (Fine) This one has a wide variety of uses, from location-specific news apps and games, to social networks.
It’s also used by ad networks included in many apps.
Location (Coarse) This one follows the same trends as Location (Fine), but is skewed towards ad networks.
Read Contacts Any access to the address book at all require this, so communication apps, social networks, or many
apps that involve sharing with friends will use this.
Call Phones This one is oddly popular. Many customization apps, especially those that seek to replace stock
Android apps, will use this, especially if they are replacing address book or home screen function-
alities. Additionally, many communication apps will use this, for obvious reasons.
Camera Any photography app or video camera app will make heavy use of this permission. This func-
tionality is often present in other apps as well, e.g. taking a photo of the user for use as a profile
photo
Write Contacts This permission is often used with Read Contacts. Many social networking sites and services wish
to provide “contact syncing” abilities with Android device, which requires having write-access to
the Contacts database.
Record Audio Like Camera, audio apps and communication apps make heavy use of this.
Send SMS Many apps seek to replace the default SMS app, which would therefore require all of the SMS
related permissions.
System Alert This permission protects drawing on the screen, on top of other apps. Many apps are designed to be
on the screen at all times, either replacing Android components, or complementing them.
Table 7.3: Use cases for common Android Permissions.
7.2.1 By Market Category
Overall, we find many PII-related permissions are frequently requested. A number of use cases exist, but it unclear if
the apps follow those use cases. To further examine this, we separate the apps in Android Census into the categories
used on the GPStore, and rerun the analysis (seen in Figure 7.3).
Immediately, the use cases described in Table 7.3 become apparent. Large spikes are seen in category Photography
and Media & Video for permission Camera — similarly with Record Audio, although it is less visible in Music &
Audio. Location data — another use case — is commonly used in Weather, Transportation and Travel. Send SMS
is found predominantly in Communication and Social. Wake Lock was found heavily in game categories, music and
media categories, and Communication, but less so in other categories, as would be expected for its use case.
Ultimately, however, some odd patterns can be observed. Despite Read Contacts being popular for apps in Com-
munication, Business, and Social, it is also found heavily in the Brain & Puzzle game category. A similar pattern is
seen in Call Phones: its predominant category is Communication, but it is found frequently in Medical, Shopping,
and Lifestyle. We also find a spike in the Get Running Apps permission in the game categories that does not appear to
be present in other market categories. Perhaps the oddest observation was the extremely large spike of Read Browser
History and Write Browser History found in the Personalization category.
30
Isolating the apps in the dataset from the Personalization category that use the Read Browser History permission
provides insight into this odd pattern. The most popular app in Personalization to use the permission is an app called
Launcher Pro[33]. Downloaded over 10 million times, with an average rating of 4.5, LauncherPro is a highly respected
third party Android Home Screen. It has 181,628 5-star ratings, and only 8,230 1-star reviews. The permission comes
from a set of widgets to access the browser shortcuts from the home screen.
The next most popular apps in the Personalization category that use the Read Browser History permission are
Seabed Live Wallpaper[51] and Heart Live Wallpaper[30], both by the same developer “Good LiveWallpaper”[27].
These two apps have each been downloaded over 1 million times, and have an average rating of 3.8 and 4.1, respec-
tively. However, the bad reviews for both apps make numerous references to poor behavior, with one user saying “The
sheer number of push ads this single dud of a wallpaper shoves on your phone is astounding.”[51]. It is clear these
apps do not use Read Browser History for a critical purpose, but rather for advertising.
Despite the fact that the two apps come from the same market category and use the same permissions, they have
vastly different expected behavior and UAA, one of which violates it frequently, the other of which is highly trusted.
Permissions, while being used rather judiciously in most parts of the market, clearly have instances when they are
requested without truly needing them. These instances degrade the effectiveness of permissions because the user lacks
a trustworthy reason why the app requires such capabilities.
7.3 Android Malware Genome Project
We project a malware dataset onto the Android Census, with the goal of identifying their Permission Fingerprints as
potential outliers. Ideally, all malicious behavior would show up in the Permission Fingerprint of an app: thus its
unique set of capabilities would stand out in the Google Play Store, showing a strong correlation between expected
behavior and Permission Fingerprint. Upon further exploration, we find many patterns of malware are easily identi-
fiable through the Permission Fingerprint, though some behavior passes by unnoticed — demonstrating the need for
AndroMEDA.
The dataset we use — the largest academic set of its kind — is the Android Malware Genome Project[67], from
NCSU. Containing almost 1,300 samples from 52 families of actual Android malware, it provides the ideal test dataset
for Android.
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Malware Class Description
Root The malware uses a rootkit as a method of attack.
Botnet The malware exhibits behavior associated with botnets, e.g. accepts remote commands.
Banking The malware is designed specifically to intercept Banking messages.
SMS The malware sends Premium SMS messages charged against the user.
Info The malware uploads personal information to a remote server, without notifying the user
Spyware The malware remains on in the background, or has the capability of remotely monitoring the smart-
phone user.
Market The malware was spotted in the official Google Play Store
Table 7.4: Malware Classes found in the Android Malware Genome Project
7.3.1 Classification
We first classify each malware family by its capabilities according to data aggregated by Spreitzenbarth[54] and
Hackmageddon[28] — with the chart shown in Figure 7.4 and the explanation of the classification of capabilities in
Table 7.4.
Of the four classes of malware discussed in Chapter 4, we observe that very few of the malware families use only
one attack vector — 6 families use only SMS attacks, and 1 family, Pjapps used botnets. Clearly, Android Malware
often uses multiple vectors. We also note that 33 of 52 — 63% of all malware families — upload personal information
to a remote server.
7.3.2 Fingerprints
The first step in analyzing whether malware Permission Fingerprints are seen as outliers is to obtain Permission
Fingerprints for all apps in the database. We then aggregated the fingerprints by classification of capabilities. The
result, Figure 7.5, provides a novel look at malware, its capabilities, and its permissions relative to the Google Play
Store. The differences in Permission Fingerprints – and thus capabilities of malware versus the GPStore total —
become obvious right away. Malware is far more likely to request access to SMS, particularly reading and writing the
database, as well as system operations like disabling the lock screen and reading system logs.
Further insight is given, however, when looking at the fingerprints of malware with a specific capability. Spyware
apps demonstrate this quite clearly: they request access to location, permission to keep the device on at all times, record
audio, and send SMS messages. These capabilities are what would be expected out of spyware. Likewise, Premium
SMS apps request access to Send SMS messages frequently2. We also observe that botnet malware occasionally
accesses system features like disabling the lock screen and reading system logs.
These observations are highly insightful, and demonstrate how the Permission Fingerprint can be used to identify
different kinds of malware. Unfortunately, things break down when we look at the Info category. This Permission
2The reason this number is not 100% is because not all variants of a family of malware known to posses a Premium SMS exploit may have that
capability
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Fingerprint, aside from Read SMS and Write SMS, does not appear significantly different than the GPStore total,
especially when considering the Market Category fluctuations observed earlier in Section 7.2.1.
7.4 By Install Count
As we have shown, all categories of malware but Info Theft Malware show profound differences in Permission Fin-
gerprints: they are far more likely to access unusual permissions than normal Android apps. However, Info Theft apps
do not show such anomalies, making them far easier to hide inside of benign apps — a technique malware writers
already use[59]. Thus, if more popular apps have more access to PII, this vector poses a serious threat.
For starters, we note that the metadata in Android Census doesn’t give precise download measurements, but rather
broad ranges (as seen in Figure 2.3). We plot these in Table 7.5, noting the number of apps in each download range
and its total percent of all downloads in the market. The top percentile — only 9 apps — accounts for an estimated3
11% of all downloads, and apps over 1 million downloads - only 2250 apps in total - account for an estimated 70% of
all downloads in the entire Google Play Store.
Download Range Number of Apps Estimated Total Downloads Percent of All Downloads Aggregate Percentage
100M-500M 9 2.7B 11.78% 11.78%
50M-100M 12 900.0M 3.93% 15.71%
10M-50M 165 4.95B 21.6% 37.31%
5M-10M 279 2.09B 9.13% 46.44%
1M-5M 1785 5.36B 23.36% 69.8%
500K-1M 2010 1.51B 6.58% 76.38%
100K-500K 10483 3.14B 13.72% 90.1%
50K-100K 9363 702.23M 3.06% 93.16%
10K-50K 37925 1.14B 4.96% 98.13%
5K-10K 24872 186.54M 0.81% 98.94%
1K-5K 66587 199.76M 0.87% 99.81%
500-1K 28676 21.51M 0.09% 99.91%
100-500 59616 17.88M 0.08% 99.98%
50-100 23394 1.75M 0.01% 99.99%
10-50 53343 1.6M 0.01% 100.0%
5-10 13720 96.04K 0.0% 100.0%
1-5 30541 91.62K 0.0% 100.0%
0-0 7694 0.0 0.0% 100.0%
Table 7.5: App download statistics from Android Census
Figure 7.6 shows the Permission Fingerprints of the top download categories on the Google Play Store. The apps
in the lower ranges, from 10K-50K, show a fingerprint very similar to the overall plot. As the install counts rise,
however, several very key permissions rise as well. Get Running Apps, Camera, Record Audio, Read Contacts, and
Wake Lock all spike in popularity, the more installs the app has. These permissions are especially sensitive PII related
permissions. Towards the very top, even more permissions are used, including Read and Write SMS and Read Browser
3The formula for estimating total downloads is the average of the download range, multiplied it by the number of apps.
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History, which are also extremely common malware permissions. Overall, aside from Read and Write SMS, the Info
Theft malware described above has a surprisingly similar Permission Fingerprint.
7.5 Conclusion
We have demonstrated several key points in this analysis. First, we demonstrated that Permission Fingerprints often
correlate with their expected behavior, but found key instances where these did not, especially with respect to PII.
We then demonstrated that different classes of malware have Permission Fingerprints that correlate strongly with
their expected behavior, but vary heavily from the rest of the GPStore. We noted, however, that SMS malware only
needs one key permission to operate — one that is not uncommon in many categories — and Info Theft apps have a
Permission Fingerprint that does not ultimately set themselves apart in the GPStore as a whole. When analyzing the
top apps, we found many opportunities for Info Theft malware to imitate their Permission Fingerprints.
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Figure 7.3: Permissions used, as a fraction of total in that category
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Figure 7.4: A summary of the malware families found in the Android Malware Genome Project. See Figure 7.4 for
explanations of the classes. Blue dots indicate Android 2.2 and below; green dots indicate Android 2.3 and below.
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Figure 7.5: Permission Fingerprints of malware with different capabilities, compared to the GPStore total
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Figure 7.6: Permission Fingerprints of apps with different ranges of install counts.
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Chapter 8
Evaluation
With AndroMEDA, we attempt to build on top of the Android Permission system, to do a better job of enforcing
the User-App Agreement. The main reasons why the Permission System failed to differentiate between malware and
normal software can be seen as a lack of context and understanding of use. When an app requests a permission, it
is granted to the app regardless of any context, at any time, and regardless of user consent. The data, after being
requested, can ultimately be manipulated and transmitted to any party without user consent.
Projects like TaintDroid[21] have begun to address the flow of personal data, which aids in the user understanding
the use of their data. Much more can be done, however, to address both context and use —which AndroMEDA does.
By instrumenting API calls, AndroMEDA can both inspect context and use of personal data as well as other important
system actions. By presenting this normally-hidden information to the user, AndroMEDA provides the user with a
feedback loop to evaluate whether the User-App Agreement has been broken.
8.1 Existing Malware Datasets
To test the effectiveness of AndroMEDA at detecting malicious behavior, we begin with testing apps from the Android
Malware Genome Project[67], the most comprehensive academic malware dataset. Unfortunately, as show in in Figure
8.1, we found only 31 (2.4%) of the nearly 1,300 samples were designed for Android 2.3 and above, when Android
fixed many rootkits. Not a single one targeted Android 4.0 or above, when Android took steps to both harden security
or Android 4.2, when Android to fix SMS related malware[7]. When looking for malware that runs on Android 2.3
and above that do not use a root exploit, we find only 4 samples (0.3%) fit.
Of these four examples, one — RogueSPPush — sends premium SMS messages, but does not request Send SMS,
rendering it ineffective. The three remaining samples — DogWars, GoldDream and DroidDreamLight — were Info
Theft malware. We found DroidDreamLight to be less than worthwhile for testing, due to its rather benign nature: the
worst action it performs is uploading the device’s IMEI to a remote server. Finally, GoldDream has botnet capabilities,
making it difficult to test, due to the lack of an existing botnet.
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Figure 8.1: Malware from the Android Malware Genome Project by Android Version
The remaining app, DogWars, makes a good testing app. Made as a “hacktivist” app in protest of an existing
app[12], DogWars repackages a game with code to send SMS messages to all contacts on the next boot. The screen-
shots in Figure 8.2 show how AndroMEDA clearly identifies when DogWars accesses contacts and sends messages,
allowing the user to identify it as malware.
Figure 8.2: AndroMEDA detecting the DogWars Malware (annotated in red)
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We have demonstrated AndroMEDA’s ability to identify malware in existing datasets, but in the process we high-
lighted the shortcomings of the current Android malware datasets. To test a future-malware oriented framework, it
would be ideal to have more sophisticated malware. Rootkits and Premium SMS malware have been addressed by
recent versions of Android: so we focus on what we believe to be the future of malware on Android: sophisticated
Info Theft Apps. We have defined IncognitoWare as the concept of hiding Info Theft Malware inside of benign apps,
designed to silently steal PII and perform other unwanted operations. Since our analysis of Permissions in the GPStore
has shown that popular apps tend to request a large amount of PII-related permissions, we can fit them all within the
existing Permission Fingerprint.
8.2 IncognitoWare Dataset
IncognitoWare has recently become one of the most popular forms of mobile malware[42]. FakeInst, discussed in
Chapter 4.5, was a repackaged version of Instagram[32] that sent premium SMS messages on start. While admit-
tedly basic, more complex versions, such as FakeAngry[65] have been found, imitating popular games, while in the
background stealing PII, installing a rootkit, and joining a botnet.
We introduce a novel set of research IncognitoWare as a representative sample of current and future mobile mal-
ware techniques. Our first example sends as much PII as it can find to a remote server; the second silently monitors
the phone in the background. We chose not to include a Premium SMS Malware sample, despite its popularity[42],
due to it being addressed in the latest version of Android. By analyzing our framework with this dataset, we hope to
demonstrate the effectiveness of addressing the UAA as a main route to detecting malware.
Creating IncognitoWare is straightforward. First, an exploit is designed and coded as its own app. Second, the
apktool[10] utility decompiles any APK file into a set of resources and smali files — decompiled Dalivk bytecode.
From there, the apktool utility is used again on the exploit, and the smali code trees are merged. The exploit entry
points are then placed inside of the host app’s code, and apktool rebuilds the project back into an APK file. This APK
is unsigned and requires the malware writer to resign it. This mismatched signature makes the APK unsuitable for
uploading to the Google Play Store, but by changing the Android package to something slightly different, it is suitable
for deployment in the Google Play Store, or third party markets.
8.3 Info Theft IncognitoWare
Our first example of next-generation IncognitoWare is simple: embed PII stealing code into any app, but only execute
it after the user has logged in. This act of logging in is sufficient to bypass automated monitoring tools like Google
Bouncer. Only executing the code after the user has performed an action also creates a plausible scenario where the
41
situation might have been intended. Ultimately, however, since nothing is presented to the user, such an action is a
clear violation of the UAA and is seen as malicious. Furthermore, we stay within the Permission Fingerprint of the
original software, meaning it is not only invisible when installing, but blocking the permission outright, or feeding
it fuzzed data, would ultimately result in legitimate actions being interfered with. This simple example is powerful
enough to steal nearly all highly-valuable PII from a device, yet inconspicuous enough to be undetected, and legitimate
enough to be unblocked.
AndroMEDA, however, can easily detect this example, seen in Figure 8.3. After the user logs in, AndroMEDA
immediately alerts the user that the PII has been read. The user then reviews the data shown in Figure 8.5 and decides
whether or not its actions break the UAA and if the app should be trusted with the actions. By comparison, the logs of
the untainted version of the app can be seen in Figure 8.4. It is worth noting that the logs in Figure 8.4 and 8.5 were
not generated by the current companion app, but offline; with additional context added describing what the user was
doing at the time of specific actions, and that these visualizations are a focus of future work.
Figure 8.3: AndroMEDA detecting the Info Theft IncognitoWare embedded within a security app
8.4 Spyware IncognitoWare
Our next example of sophisticated IncognitoWare is designed to continuously spy on the user, while staying within the
capabilities of a trusted app. We first find an app that has all the requirements for spyware: access to location, Internet,
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Figure 8.4: AndroMEDA logs of the normal version of the security app
Figure 8.5: AndroMEDA logs of Info Theft IncognitoWare embedded within a security app
wake lock, and starting at boot. We then introduce our malware, which is triggered an arbitrary amount of time after
the initial startup — five minutes is long enough to evade Google Bouncer[36]. After that, the device wakes up every
five minutes, gathers a location fix, and sends that information to a remote location. As before, many examples exist
of apps that use similar behavior for non malicious purposes, making policies to guard against it difficult.
Once again, AndroMEDA can alert the user of this kind of behavior easily. Figure 8.6 shows the user installing
the app, starting it up, going to the home screen, and eventually noticing the suspicious behavior when the phone is
idling. The user then inspects the logs of this app, (Figure 8.7 — with context added), finds this to be a continuous
occurrence, and decides that the app is malware. Compared to Figure 8.9, the app is clearly accessing location in a
suspicious pattern — and the usage pattern is the key indicator. When compared to Figure 8.8, however, the main
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indicator is the address the information is going towards, an address not associated with the main app. The normal
logs in Figure 8.8 may break UAA for some users — the app logs the user’s location in the background and sends it to
a remote server. Overall, this highlights the ability of AndroMEDA to capture both the context and use of permissions:
the patterns of access provide context and the network locations provide use.
Figure 8.6: AndroMEDA detecting the Spyware IncognitoWare embedded within a weather app
Figure 8.7: AndroMEDA logs of Spyware IncognitoWare embedded within a weather app
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Figure 8.8: AndroMEDA logs of a normal version of a weather app, when the user has consented to location gathering
Figure 8.9: AndroMEDA logs of a normal version of a weather app, when the user has not consented to location
gathering
8.5 Companion App
When the user reviews the logs, they have the option to report suspicious behavior, giving a description of what the
user was doing and what the suspicious behavior was. These reports are collected in a centralized database. The
companion app also listens for when the user installs new applications and checks the same database to see if there
are any existing reports. If the number of reports passes a threshold, the companion app will notify the user, enabling
them to review what other people have reported about the apps. These features — being notified of suspicious apps
and reviewing them — does not require the AndroMEDA extensions and can be installed on any Android device. This
enables a small set of users to alert a much larger population.
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8.6 Conclusion
Overall, we have demonstrated that the ability to log and visualize app behavior can lead to an increased ability
to detect malware. Our logs and visualizations show clear differences between actions that fall within the User-App
Agreement and actions that do not, even being able to visualize actions that may break some user’s UAA but not others.
The ability to report when an app breaks the UAA and having that report spread to other users enables AndroMEDA
to become a community effort, further increasing its effectiveness.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion and Future Work
9.1 Conclusion
AndroMEDA helps users understand the context in which their Personally Identifiable Information is used, which
allows them to make more informed decisions on whether an app is acting maliciously or not. In this paper, we
introduced four key items: User-App Agreement, Android Census, AndroMEDA and IncognitoWare.
9.1.1 User-App Agreement
We analyzed the current Android security framework: the Permission System, and found its main flaws were its lack of
addressing context and use, which we generalized into the User-App Agreement — a framework for consenting to and
trusting specific actions an app may perform. Whereas Android Permissions exceeded at defining general capabilities
of an app, and these capabilities further shape the User-App Agreement, they fail to address the context in which the
permissions are used and what they are used for.
9.1.2 Android Census
To perform a full analysis of the current state of Android Permissions, we use a novel dataset, Android Census. By
analyzing more than 80% of apps in the Google Play Store, we are able to better understand the interrelationship of
permissions and expected behavior. We produce key insights as to the popularity of apps versus their PII permis-
sions and when apps deviate from their expected behavior, potentially violating the User-App Agreement. We then
analyze a comprehensive malware dataset using the same techniques and find that many types of malware can be iden-
tified purely by its Permission Fingerprint. We conclusively show the connection between Permissions and Expected
Behavior is present, but not strong enough to differentiate between Info Theft Malware and many popular apps.
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9.1.3 AndroMEDA
Building off the concept of the User-App Agreement, we introduce AndroMEDA. Key parts of the User-App Agree-
ment were previously unavailable to the user until AndroMEDA. By giving the user more information on the context
and use of permissions, they can evaluate whether or not they trust those actions and, ultimately, whether or not the
app is acting maliciously or not. After untrusted behavior is spotted, the actions can be reported, and knowledge can
be spread to all users. All of this increases user’s awareness of app behavior and helps mitigate Info Theft Malware
on Android.
9.1.4 IncognitoWare
We highlighted the need for more modern Android malware datasets. To address this, we introduced a dataset of
IncognitoWare — repackaged trusted apps with additional malicious behavior embedded. We believe this is a more
comprehensive look at Android security because it highlights the need to understand context in order to identify
malicious behavior.
9.2 Future Work
AndroMEDA is, ultimately, not a complete solution for detecting all Android malware. Projects like TaintDroid
and TISSA provide functionality that would greatly enhance the data gathering abilities and response options of
AndroMEDA. Integrating TISSA would allow users or the AndroMEDA system to temporally block access to sensitive
data, while unblocking access to the same data at a later time when the user trusts the action. Overall, adding more
API instrumenting would prove useful, as projects like TapLogger provide future challenges.
A main focus of AndroMEDA is providing feedback to the user; to that end, visualization is an important area of
future work. Visualizing the wealth of information in a concise way that avoids user fatigue is a main challenge and
subject to future study.
AndroMEDA could also benefit greatly from the probabilistic modeling of pBMDs and Crowdroid, in correlating
user action with permission behavior. These would not replace the need to alert the user, but would instead be better
able to dictate when to send different classes of alerts to the user — as the decision of what is malware is ultimately
up to them.
The wealth of data in Android Census was also not fully explored. We are currently interested in seeing if specific
keywords in user reviews correlate with malicious software or other problematic apps. Many more areas of metadata
— like the description, developer, etc — can be further explored, to see if it gives additional insight into the nature of
malware on Android.
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Finally, the concept of the User-App Agreement introduced in this paper could be greatly expanded upon. User
Studies of trust in specific actions can greatly increase our understanding of what actions users tend to trust and when
they are untrustworthy. These same user studies could also help demonstrate the effectiveness of AndroMEDA in
spotting Info Theft Malware.
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Appendix A
A.1 Android Permissions
Name ID Severity 3rd Party
Usable
Bind Wallpaper android.permission.BIND WALLPAPER signatureOrSystem no
View Google Services com.google.android.providers.gsf.permission.-
READ GSERVICES
none yes
Force Back android.permission.FORCE BACK signatureOrSystem no
Read Calendar android.permission.READ CALENDAR dangerous yes
Read Frame Buffer android.permission.READ FRAME BUFFER signature no
NFC android.permission.NFC dangerous yes
Read Sync Stats android.permission.READ SYNC STATS none yes
Battery Stats ?android.permission.BATTERY STATS none yes
Internet android.permission.INTERNET dangerous yes
Change Config android.permission.CHANGE CONFIGURATION dangerous yes
Google Auth - Docs com.google.android.googleapps.permission.-
GOOGLE AUTH.writely
dangerous yes
Test android.permission.HARDWARE TEST signature no
Read Google Contacts com.google.android.googleapps.permission.-
GOOGLE AUTH.cp
dangerous yes
Read GTalk com.google.android.providers.talk.permission.READ ONLY dangerous yes
Google Auth - Calendar com.google.android.googleapps.permission.-
GOOGLE AUTH.cl
dangerous yes
Bind Input android.permission.BIND INPUT METHOD signature no
Set Time Zone android.permission.SET TIME ZONE dangerous yes
Access Cache android.permission.ACCESS CACHE FILESYSTEM signatureOrSystem no
Write Sync Settings android.permission.WRITE SYNC SETTINGS dangerous yes
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Change Data Settings android.permission.CHANGE BACKGROUND DATA SETTING signature no
Write Google Services android.permission.WRITE GSERVICES signatureOrSystem no
Inject Events android.permission.INJECT EVENTS signature no
Bind Device Admin android.permission.BIND DEVICE ADMIN signature no
Force Stop android.permission.FORCE STOP PACKAGES signature no
Write GTalk com.google.android.providers.talk.permission.WRITE ONLY dangerous yes
Write Secure Settings android.permission.WRITE SECURE SETTINGS signatureOrSystem no
Call All Numbers android.permission.CALL PRIVILEGED signatureOrSystem no
Broadcast App Re-
moved
android.permission.BROADCAST PACKAGE REMOVED signatureOrSystem no
System Alert android.permission.SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW dangerous yes
Location - Extra android.permission.ACCESS LOCATION EXTRA COMMANDS none yes
Brick android.permission.BRICK signature no
Dump System android.permission.DUMP signatureOrSystem no
Shutdown android.permission.SHUTDOWN signature no
Change WiFi android.permission.CHANGE WIFI STATE dangerous yes
Receive SMS android.permission.RECEIVE SMS dangerous yes
Modify Phone android.permission.MODIFY PHONE STATE signatureOrSystem no
Read Attachment com.google.android.gm.permission.-
READ ATTACHMENT PREVIEW
signature no
Manage Accounts android.permission.ACCOUNT MANAGER signature no
Read GMail com.google.android.gm.permission.READ GMAIL signature no
Animation Scale android.permission.SET ANIMATION SCALE dangerous yes
Set Process Limit android.permission.SET PROCESS LIMIT dangerous yes
Move Package android.permission.MOVE PACKAGE signatureOrSystem no
Google Auth - Other com.google.android.googleapps.permission.-
GOOGLE AUTH.OTHER SERVICES
dangerous yes
Debug App android.permission.SET DEBUG APP ? no
Install DRM android.permission.INSTALL DRM none yes
Bluetooth android.permission.BLUETOOTH dangerous yes
Camera android.permission.CAMERA dangerous yes
Set Wallpaper Hints android.permission.SET WALLPAPER HINTS none yes
Reboot android.permission.REBOOT signatureOrSystem no
Broadcast WAP android.permission.BROADCAST WAP PUSH signature no
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Google Auth - Maps com.google.android.googleapps.permission.-
GOOGLE AUTH.local
dangerous yes
View Network android.permission.ACCESS NETWORK STATE none yes
Status Bar android.permission.STATUS BAR signatureOrSystem no
Write User Dictionary android.permission.WRITE USER DICTIONARY none yes
Read Browser History com.android.browser.permission.-
READ HISTORY BOOKMARKS
dangerous yes
Access DRM android.permission.ACCESS DRM signature no
Record Audio android.permission.RECORD AUDIO dangerous yes
Write Contacts android.permission.WRITE CONTACTS dangerous yes
Send Gmail com.google.android.gm.permission.AUTO SEND signature no
Control Location android.permission.CONTROL LOCATION UPDATES signatureOrSystem no
Bind Widgets android.permission.BIND APPWIDGET signatureOrSystem no
Send Linux Signals android.permission.SIGNAL PERSISTENT PROCESSES dangerous yes
Install Location
Provider
android.permission.INSTALL LOCATION PROVIDER signatureOrSystem no
Google Auth - Drive com.google.android.googleapps.permission.-
GOOGLE AUTH.wise
dangerous yes
Start On Boot android.permission. RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED none yes
Clear Phone android.permission.MASTER CLEAR signatureOrSystem no
Read Input State android.permission.READ INPUT STATE signature no
Internal System UI android.permission.INTERNAL SYSTEM WINDOW signature no
Manage App Token android.permission.MANAGE APP TOKENS signature no
Access Email com.android.email.permission.ACCESS PROVIDER ? no
Subscribe Feeds android.permission.WRITE SETTINGS dangerous yes
SIP android.permission.USE SIP dangerous yes
Google Auth - Ap-
pEngine
com.google.android.googleapps.permission.-
GOOGLE AUTH.ah
dangerous yes
Write APM android.permission.WRITE APN SETTINGS dangerous yes
Access Surface android.permission.ACCESS SURFACE FLINGER signature no
Factory Test android.permission.FACTORY TEST signature no
Google Auth - Gmail com.google.android.googleapps.permission.-
GOOGLE AUTH.mail
dangerous yes
Read System Logs android.permission.READ LOGS dangerous yes
Process Outgoing Calls android.permission.PROCESS OUTGOING CALLS dangerous yes
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Update Device Stats android.permission.UPDATE DEVICE STATS signature no
Write Calendar android.permission.WRITE CALENDAR dangerous yes
Google Auth - Youtube com.google.android.googleapps.permission.-
GOOGLE AUTH.youtube
dangerous yes
Read Feeds android.permission.SUBSCRIBED FEEDS READ none yes
Manage Accounts android.permission.MANAGE ACCOUNTS dangerous yes
Send SMS android.permission.SEND SMS dangerous yes
Google Auth - Blogger com.google.android.googleapps.permission.-
GOOGLE AUTH.blogger
dangerous yes
Mock Location android.permission.ACCESS MOCK LOCATION dangerous yes
Change WiFi Multicast android.permission.CHANGE WIFI MULTICAST STATE dangerous yes
Access Passwords com.google.android.googleapps.permission.-
ACCESS GOOGLE PASSWORD
signatureOrSystem no
Google Auth - All com.google.android.googleapps.permission.-
GOOGLE AUTH.ALL SERVICES
dangerous yes
Write SMS android.permission.WRITE SMS dangerous yes
Get Running Apps android.permission.GET TASKS dangerous yes
Delete Packages android.permission.DELETE PACKAGES signatureOrSystem no
Access Checkins android.permission.ACCESS CHECKIN PROPERTIES signatureOrSystem no
Set Preferred Apps android.permission.SET PREFERRED APPLICATIONS signature no
Set Time android.permission.SET TIME signatureOrSystem no
Vibrate android.permission.VIBRATE none yes
Diagnostic android.permission.DIAGNOSTIC signature no
Call Phones android.permission.CALL PHONE dangerous yes
Flashlight android.permission.FLASHLIGHT none yes
Read Phone State android.permission.READ PHONE STATE dangerous yes
Location (Coarse) android.permission.ACCESS COARSE LOCATION dangerous yes
Clear App Data android.permission.CLEAR APP USER DATA signature no
Broadcast SMS android.permission.BROADCAST SMS signatureOrSystem no
Kill Background android.permission.KILL BACKGROUND PROCESSES none yes
Stop App Switching android.permission.STOP APP SWITCHES signature no
Access WiFi android.permission.ACCESS WIFI STATE none yes
Receive SMS android.permission.RECEIVE MMS dangerous yes
Wake Lock android.permission.WAKE LOCK dangerous yes
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Write Browser History com.android.browser.permission.-
WRITE HISTORY BOOKMARKS
dangerous yes
Delete Cache Files android.permission.DELETE CACHE FILES signatureOrSystem no
View Google Auth com.google.android.googleapps.permission.GOOGLE AUTH none yes
Read Accounts android.permission.GET ACCOUNTS none yes
Change Network android.permission.CHANGE NETWORK STATE dangerous yes
Read Sync Settings android.permission.READ SYNC SETTINGS none yes
Disable Lockscreen android.permission.DISABLE KEYGUARD dangerous yes
Write Gmail com.google.android.gm.permission.WRITE GMAIL signature no
Use Credentials android.permission.USE CREDENTIALS dangerous yes
Write Feeds android.permission.SUBSCRIBED FEEDS WRITE dangerous yes
Kill Background Apps ? android.permission.KILL BACKGROUND PROCESSES none yes
Change Components android.permission.CHANGE COMPONENT ENABLED STATE signature no
Backup android.permission.BACKUP signatureOrSystem no
Google Auth - Finance com.google.android.googleapps.permission.-
GOOGLE AUTH.finance
dangerous yes
Expand Status Bar android.permission.EXPAND STATUS BAR none yes
Bluetooth Admin android.permission.BLUETOOTH ADMIN dangerous yes
Location (Fine) android.permission.ACCESS FINE LOCATION dangerous yes
Youtube Username com.google.android.googleapps.permission.-
GOOGLE AUTH.YouTubeUser
dangerous yes
Persist Activity (dep.) android.permission.PERSISTENT ACTIVITY DEPRECATED no
Reorder Tasks android.permission.REORDER TASKS ? no
Receive WAP Push android.permission.RECEIVE WAP PUSH dangerous yes
Receive C2DM com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE none yes
Set Wallpaper android.permission.SET WALLPAPER none yes
Google Auth - Picasa com.google.android.googleapps.permission.-
GOOGLE AUTH.lh2
dangerous yes
Read User Dictionary android.permission.READ USER DICTIONARY dangerous yes
Write Storage android.permission.WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE dangerous yes
Get Package Size android.permission.GET PACKAGE SIZE none yes
Install Packages android.permission.INSTALL PACKAGES signatureOrSystem no
Authenticate Accounts android.permission.AUTHENTICATE ACCOUNTS dangerous yes
Set Alarm com.android.alarm.permission.SET ALARM none yes
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Google Auth com.google.android.googleapps.permission.-
GOOGLE AUTH.grandcentral
dangerous yes
Read Contacts android.permission.READ CONTACTS dangerous yes
CDMA Provisioning android.permission.PERFORM CDMA PROVISIONING signatureOrSystem no
Modify Audio android.permission.MODIFY AUDIO SETTINGS dangerous yes
Set Orientation android.permission.SET ORIENTATION signature no
Set Activity Watcher android.permission.SET ACTIVITY WATCHER signature no
Read SMS android.permission.READ SMS dangerous yes
Broadcast Sticky android.permission.BROADCAST STICKY none yes
Mount Filesystems android.permission.MOUNT FORMAT FILESYSTEMS dangerous yes
Clear App Cache android.permission.CLEAR APP CACHE dangerous yes
Mount Filesystems android.permission.MOUNT UNMOUNT FILESYSTEMS dangerous yes
Table A.1: All Android Permissions in the Google Play Store
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